A long time ago in a galaxy not so far away, there was a decentralized, global network of computers. These computers shared information with each other regardless of how far apart they were and whether there was any direct line of communication. In the very beginning, this network was used exclusively by government and military agencies, educational and research institutions, government contractors, scientists, and technological specialists.
At the apex of this hierarchy is a set of 13 root zone servers, which identify the name servers storing the root zone files for all the top-level domains, including both the generic domains-such as .com, .net, or .org-and ccTLDs. 4 Each of these servers is assigned a letter from A to M. For example, the Internet Software Consortium operates the "F Root Server," and the server in London is called the "K Root Server." More than three-quarters of these servers are located in the United States, and the rest is found in Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
To perform its identifying function, a domain name needs to be unique. Thus, all root zone files must contain identical data. 5 As a past legacy, the database in the A Root Server, which the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) currently controls by virtue of its contract with the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC), is considered authoritative. The other root servers merely copy this root zone file to their servers.
Due to this hierarchy and the lucrative market created by the sale of domain names, there has been an ongoing power struggle over the control of the DNS and authority to delegate and administer ccTLDs. This Chapter recounts the story of this struggle. It traces how ccTLD policymaking has been transformed from ad hoc, informal coordination to international, contract-based governance. It also discusses the various major players in the ccTLD debate: ICANN, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), ccTLD managers, national governments, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
This story began when scientists, including Jon Postel and Paul Mockapetris, developed the DNS in 1983. 6 Under a contract with the U.S. government, Postel, and later IANA, managed the DNS and delegated ccTLDs to foreign managers. 7 The first ccTLD .us was created and delegated in March 1985 (see Chapter 11) . 8 Two other delegations-.uk (for the United Kingdom) and .il (for Israel)-followed in the same year.
In the very beginning, very few countries were connected to the Internet backbone and, therefore, had no need for a ccTLD. Even when they needed one, ccTLD delegations usually fell into the hands of university computer science departments and educational and research networking organizations, rather than government agencies and organizations that historically provided postal, telephone, or telegraph services.
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From 1985 to 1993, Postel delegated ccTLDs on a first-come, first-served basis. Using the notion of a "responsible person," Postel required very limited basic administrative criteria before he delegated a ccTLD. As he wrote, the person in charge of assigning second-level domain names "is generally the first person that asks for the job (and is somehow considered a 'responsible person')." 10 To avoid political problems, Postel used the ISO 3166-1 country codes to define what entity would warrant a ccTLD. 11 Because these codes were provided by the International Organization for Standardization, a United Nations agency, their objectivity successfully shielded IANA from the political pressure from deciding what was and what was not a country.
Although the use of ISO 3166-1 codes appears systematic and well-planned, the .uk ccTLD betrayed the ad hoc nature of early ccTLD policymaking. 12 The ISO 3166-1 country code for the United Kingdom is .gb (for "Great Britain"). Yet, Postel assigned .uk as the country's ccTLD. Moreover, during a brief period in 1996, IANA delegated codes under the ISO 3166 reserve list, which the ISO 3166 Maintenance Agency reserved specifically for postal purposes. 13 Notwithstanding the ad hoc nature of ccTLD delegation, conflicts rarely arose. Even if they did, when two parties competed for the same ccTLD, Postel usually succeeded in using subtle pressure to induce disputing parties to settle the issue before delegation.
14 As IANA reasoned in a later document, dispute resolution "is usually a long drawn out process, leaving at least one party unhappy, so it is far better when the parties can reach an agreement among themselves." 15 By the early 1990s, the Internet had exploded on to the world stage. As more countries became connected and as national governments (and private companies) began to realize the full socio-economic potential of a ccTLD, requests for ccTLD delegations increased substantially. The number of ccTLD delegations went from 46 in 1990 to 108 in 1993. By the mid-1990s, IANA had delegated virtually all the ccTLDs, including those in countries that had limited Internet access. 16 With the increasing interest in ccTLDs, a more explicit delegation and administration policy was in order. In March 1994, Postel published RFC 1591, which described his delegation and administration policy. 17 It stated, first and foremost, that there must be a designated manager for supervising the ccTLD name space, and the administrative contact must reside in the country. Because the manager is the "trustee" for both the nation and the global Internet community, the manager must be equitable to all those who request a domain name. In addition, the manager must do a "satisfactory job" of operating the DNS service for the domain, and "significantly interested parties" in the domain must agree that the delegation is appropriate. Since the publication of RFC 1591, IANA has issued a number of ccTLD News Memos. 18 Although many of these memos were issued for communication purposes, the first memo addressed the relationship between ccTLD managers and national governments. It stated that IANA "takes the desires of the government of the country very seriously, and will take them as a major consideration in any transition discussion."
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Notwithstanding RFC 1591 and the first ccTLD News Memo, controversies existed. For example, RFC 1591 required that ccTLD managers reside in the requested domain. Yet, a British company successfully registered Libya's ccTLD .ly by listing its owner's Tripoli address as the address of the administrative contact. 20 In addition, IANA has delegated ccTLDs to unaccountable commercial entities that had limited ties to the concerned domain. Out of recourse from IANA, the government of Bhutan sought assistance from the ITU, the UnitedNations-affiliated body that governs international telecommunications matters, to reclaim its ccTLD .bt. 21 Even worse, IANA was dragged into domestic disputes and had to make arbitrary decisions in the case concerning Haiti's ccTLD .ht. 22 Moreover, not all political entities were included in the ISO 3166-1 list, and those omitted were understandably concerned about how IANA's actions (or the lack thereof) could frustrate their political aspirations. For example, the Palestinians did not receive the .ps domain until the ISO 3166-1 list included the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 23 Conversely, despite its dissolution in 1991, the Soviet Union continues to exist in cyberspace, because IANA fails to delete the .su domain from the root zone file. 24 The European Union is equally unhappy about the ISO 3166-1 codes. Despite its size and economic importance, it failed to obtain its .eu name space, because the ISO 3166-1 list does not recognize supranational entities. 25 In September 2000, the ICANN board finally passed a resolution approving the delegation of the .eu ccTLD.
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The European Commission subsequently adopted the regulation for the creation of the yet-to-be-determined .eu registry. 27 Meanwhile, the Internet had become increasingly commercial and global. By the mid1990s, the U.S. government decided to privatize the DNS. 28 Following a request for comments from the public, the DoC published a proposal to reform the DNS administration in January 1998. 29 Known as the DNS Green Paper, this proposal mapped out the Clinton administration's domain name policy and explained why the DoC had authority to regulate the DNS. Although the Green Paper was intended to be consultative by nature, many found the document controversial.
In light of this reaction, the DoC abandoned its original rulemaking plan. Instead, it issued a nonbinding statement of policy that became known as the DNS White Paper. 30 The White Paper delineated four basic principles that were used to develop the new DNS system, namely "stability, competition, private bottom-up coordination, and representation." Noting the need to withdraw the U.S. government from DNS administration, the policy statement called for the establishment of a private entity that would take over the DNS. As the White Paper stated, "overall policy guidance and control of the TLDs [top-level domains] and the Internet root server system should be vested in a single organization that is representative of Internet users around the globe."
In addition, the White Paper noted, "neither national governments acting as sovereigns nor intergovernmental organizations acting as representatives of governments should participate in management of Internet names and addresses." Nonetheless, the White Paper recognized the need to ensure international input into the new DNS. It also acknowledged the authority of national governments "to manage or establish policy for their own ccTLDs." Finally, the White Paper identified cybersquatting-the pre-emptive registration of trademarks as domain names by third parties-as a major problem in the DNS. It called upon the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to "initiate a balanced and transparent process" to provide the new entity with recommendations on how to deal with cybersquatting. Pursuant to this invitation, WIPO launched the First WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, a lengthy and extensive global consultative process that involved consultation meetings in 14 countries in six continents and the participation of a large number of government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, professional associations, corporations, and individuals. 31 Shortly after the DoC published the White Paper, ICANN was incorporated as a private not-for-profit corporation in California, with Postel as its chief technical officer and a board of directors that have limited knowledge of the Internet and domain name matters. 32 In November 1998, the DoC entered into an agreement with ICANN concerning the transfer of DNS management. 33 To take over IANA's operation, ICANN also entered into an agreement with the Information Sciences Institute at the University of Southern California, where Postel worked until his untimely death. 34 A few months later, the DoC officially recognized ICANN as the private entity mentioned in the White Paper. 35 As Professor Michael Froomkin observed, this development was "no coincidence…. The whole point of the White Paper had been to find a more formal structure for DNS management that left it in Postel's capable hands-and could be presented as a pro-Internet, deregulatory victory for the Clinton administration (and Ira Magaziner). ICANN exists because the Department of Commerce called for it to exist." 36 Structurally, ICANN benefits from the input of its directors, supporting organizations, and special advisory committees. 37 The committee that deals with global policy and ccTLD matters is the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), which is regularly attended by national governments, distinct economies, and intergovernmental organizations, such as the ITU and WIPO. Under the recently reformed structure, the GAC provides direct advice to the ICANN board and appoints liaisons to the board, the committee that nominates the directors, and the various supporting organizations.
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To "announce" its taking over IANA's function and to emphasize its authority over ccTLD matters, ICANN issued ICP-1 (ICANN Corporate Policy) in May 1999. 39 Combining RFC 1591 and the ccTLD News Memo #1, this document strengthened the power of national governments on ccTLD matters. As it stated, "The desires of the government of a country with regard to delegation of a ccTLD are taken very seriously. The IANA will make them a major consideration in any TLD delegation/transfer discussions."
In February 2000, the GAC presented to ICANN the Principles for Delegation and Administration of ccTLDs ("GAC Principles"), 40 which ICANN later used extensively to justify their redelegation efforts. Although the GAC Principles sought to provide "the model for institutionalizing the relationship between ICANN, ccTLD delegations, and the relevant national governments or public authorities," 41 many found the document controversial and antithetical to the interests of ccTLD managers.
Since its establishment, ICANN has delegated the .ps to the Occupied Palestinian Territory and deleted Zaire's .zr in light of the country's change of name. 42 It has also redelegated 10 ccTLDs-Pitcairn Island's .pn, Canada's .ca, Australia's .au (see Chapter 12), Japan's .jp, Burundi's .bi, Malawi's .mw, Laos' .la, Sudan's .sd, Kenya's .ke, and Afghanistan's .af. 43 With the exception of Canada, ICANN has entered into contractual relationships with all of the new ccTLD managers upon redelegation. 44 In addition, ICANN has been working actively with other ccTLD managers to document their relationships. These relationships vary greatly with respect to the type of organization, policies followed, economics, language, culture, legal environment, and relations with governments. 45 While ICANN expected ccTLD managers to enter into contracts in which the managers would acknowledge ICANN's authority and would agree to contribute fees to the organization, 46 the managers refused. In response, the managers questioned ICANN's authority and criticized the organization for its lack of openness, accountability, and representation.
In February 2002, ICANN President Stuart Lynn openly admitted the need for reforms, something critics have advocated since ICANN's establishment. 47 He wrote, "if ICANN comes to be seen . . . as simply a tool of the U.S. Government, it will no longer have any hope of accomplishing its original mission." Seeking to reconcile the organization's relationship with ccTLD managers, the proposal recommended that ICANN replace the five at-large board seats with government representatives.
In December 2002, ICANN finally completed its reforms. 48 Under the new structure, ICANN has a volunteer board of directors, including 15 voting and six non-voting members, all of which will be selected by the supporting organizations and ICANN's Nominating Committee. To facilitate interests of the ccTLD managers and national governments, a new Country Code Domain Name Supporting Organization (CCNSO) will be established.
While ICANN remains relevant to the ccTLD debate, the increasing concern of ccTLD managers and national governments over ccTLD policymaking might affect how ICANN develops its policy. As Kenneth Cukier pointed out, ccTLD managers have the potential to control ICANN's future: "The confederation of independent ccTLD administrators could bring ICANN vitally-needed legitimacy and funding if it formally recognizes the authority of ICANN and pay it fees. Conversely, if the ccTLD community continues to balk from establishing a formal relationship with ICANN, it would weaken the institution." 49 After all, if the ccTLD managers could convince the DoC that ICANN could not handle ccTLD matters, the DoC might decide not to renew ICANN's contract.
Apart from ccTLD managers, national governments have played an increasingly important role in the ccTLD debate. In a recent survey, Professor Michael Geist found a diverse array of relationships between national governments and ccTLD managers. 50 While government agencies and departments manage 10 ccTLDs, national governments have contractual or informal relationships with many others. Some registries, like those in Canada and the United States, also create a relationship between the country and the domain name registrants by requiring local presence as a prerequisite to registration. 51 Today, national governments recognize ccTLDs "as a component of their sovereignty and a vital national interest." 52 Realizing that ccTLDs may denote the "brand of the country," some governments openly embrace ccTLDs as "a platform for national economic growth and the institutions of civil society brought online." 53 Some, like Tuvalu, even use ccTLDs as a revenuegenerating source, selling off rights in its name space for tens of millions of dollars. 54 As ccTLDs become increasingly important, national governments begin to assert control over the administration of their ccTLDs. For example, Australia, Canada, and Japan have petitioned ICANN for the redelegation of their domains. Likewise, the European Union is working closely with ICANN to create the .eu name space.
However, not all governments are interested in working with ICANN. Some might prefer to act alone, or to abandon ICANN for a more favorable international forum, such as the ITU. 55 Indeed, some governments have already sought to use national legislation to regulate local ccTLD managers. A case in point is the government of South Africa, which recently introduced legislation to reclaim control of the .za name space from the incumbent ccTLD manager. 56 Similarly, during the controversial redelegation of the .au domain, the Australian government reminded ICANN that "as a last resort the Australian Government could invoke legislation relating to the self-regulation of the domain name system." 57 Legally, some governments can consider using the "eminent domain" doctrine, 58 which, if applicable, allows governments to take away private property at fair market value to promote an overriding public interest. 59 Given the socio-economic importance of a ccTLD these governments would likely be able to convince the courts that their actions are constitutional. Nonetheless, such governmental action might not be desirable, for it would bring formal political control over the ccTLD system, and impose constraints on the DNS that ICANN was designed to prevent. 60 To break free of ICANN, the governments can also join together to establish an alternative root zone file, or a system of root zone files, that replaces the current root zone file. ICANN's governance structure is premised on the general consensus that there can be only one authoritative root zone file, lest there be inefficiency, inconnectivity, economic injury, or even chaos in the DNS. However, if governments become so frustrated with ICANN that they would rather risk infrastructure damages than remain subjected to an overbearing "Leviathan," many might consider alternative roots desirable. 61 Finally, in the absence of ICANN's intervention or oversight, the international community can work together to develop a "code of practice" to promote harmonization and compliance while minimizing disputes. For example, they can draft an international treaty that sets the parameters of ccTLD management and administration practice. They can also work together to develop a nonbonding document that provides guiding principles to ccTLD managers and national governments.
A case in point is the WIPO ccTLD Best Practices for the Prevention and Resolution of Property Disputes,
62 which WIPO released in June 2001. This document provides voluntary guidelines concerning registration practices and dispute resolution procedures. These guidelines were particularly needed, because ccTLD managers retain the power to set policies for their domain-for example, they can decide whether registrants have to be residents of the country, whether they are subject to the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), and whether their personal information will be displayed on a publicly available WHOIS database.
Of notable interest is the final section of the Report, which advocates the adoption of the UDRP in the absence of any contrary local privacy regulations. 63 The UDRP was introduced in October 1999. It sets forth the terms and conditions related to a dispute between the registrant and a third party over the registration and use of a domain name. 64 Although commentators have criticized the UDRP for its procedural weaknesses, 65 the policy has been widely acclaimed for its simplicity and cost-effectiveness in resolving trademark disputes. Since the UDRP entered into force in December 1999, thousands of cases have been filed, and the majority of these cases has been resolved satisfactorily and efficiently.
Over the next few years, the struggle for control of the DNS and ccTLD delegations will likely continue. Unlike this story, however, the sequel will be very different. There is little doubt that the story will still include ICANN, IANA, ccTLD managers, national governments, GAC, ITU, and WIPO. However, the story will also feature new, emerging players, like CCNSO, CENTR (Council of European National Top-Level Domain Registries), 66 powerful individual ccTLD managers, 67 intellectual property rights holders, Internet service providers, and major telecommunications and information technology companies. As a result, few can forecast how the future will unfold. 
